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Abstract
Spatial features of an object can be specified using two different response types: either by use of symbols or motorically by
directly acting upon the object. Is this response dichotomy reflected in a dual representation of the visual world: one for
perception and one for action? Previously, symbolic and motoric responses, specifying location, has been shown to rely on a
common representation. What about more elaborate features such as length and orientation? Here we show that when
motoric and symbolic responses are made within the same trial, the probability of making the same symbolic and motoric
response is well above chance for both length and orientation. This suggests that motoric and symbolic responses to length
and orientation are driven by a common representation. We also show that, for both response types, the spatial features of
an object are processed independently. This finding of matching object-processing characteristics is also in agreement with
the idea of a common representation driving both response types.
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Introduction
Motoric responses and symbolic responses
The spatial features of a visual stimulus can be specified
behaviorally using two distinct response types. One type can be
referred to as a motoric response. This response type is made by
directly acting motorically upon the stimulus. When making a
motoric response there is a non-arbitrary relation between features
of the stimulus and the correct response. As an example, when
grasping a large object with thumb and index finger there is a
larger distance between the fingers than when grasping a smaller
object. When responding motorically, the participant’s grip
aperture indicates an estimation of size. Another type of response
can be referred to as a symbolic response. In making a symbolic
response, the participant is intentionally communicating a
perceptual judgment using a symbol system. Using this type of
response there can be, an arbitrary relation between the stimulus
and the response. Pressing key 1 on a keyboard when shown a large
object and key 2 when shown a small object is an example of a
purely symbolic response to object size using an arbitrary mapping
between response type and type of stimulus feature (arbitrary
because the experimenter could just as well have decided to use
the reverse mapping). When responding symbolically, the partic-
ipant has typically been instructed to communicate his conscious
perceptual estimation of specific stimulus features by the use of
some symbol system.
Here we investigate the nature of the visual representations used
to guide the two basic response types referred to as symbolic responses
and motoric responses. More specifically, we investigate if these two
basic response types are driven by common or separate visual
representations of the spatial features of an object [1–5].
Answering this question is important for the ongoing debate
concerning the degree of segregation of the neural processing
streams underpinning symbolic and motoric responses. A prom-
inent theory in this debate is the perception-action model
developed by Milner and Goodale [1]. Seen through the optics
of our current study the perception-action model exists in two
versions: a version with strong segregation and a version with weak
segregation. In the strong segregation version, the representations
of spatial features of objects, which are driving motoric responses,
are computed in isolation from the representations of spatial
features of objects driving symbolic responses [1–3]. In the weak
version a common representation of spatial features of objects is
driving both motoric responses and symbolic responses [4,5] (also,
see commentary by Goodale and Milner in [6]). In this weak
version of the perception-action model, the visual signals only
separate for the purpose of transforming the representations of the
spatial features of objects into formats suitable for making either a
motoric or a symbolic response.
Answering the question of whether one common representation
or two separate representations of the spatial features of an object
drive the two response types will allow us to decide between the
strong and the weak version of the perception-action model.
In the context of the perception-action model, motoric and
symbolic responses are often referred to as actions and perceptual
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responses respectively (or estimates, reports or judgments [2,7,8]).
An action can be both physical and mental. Therefore, the term
motoric response is more precise since it relates only to a physical
action. For this reason, we have chosen to use the term motoric
response. Perceptual responses are responses based on perception.
Perception is what happens when we become aware of a stimulus
through sensory processing. Therefore, perception is more than
awareness since it pertains to both sensory processing and
awareness. By speaking of actions (such as motoric responses) vs.
perceptual responses it is implicitly implied that the sensory
processing behind awareness of a stimulus is different from the
sensory processing behind an action (such as a motoric response).
Since it is not known whether the sensory processes behind
awareness of a stimulus are different from those behind a motoric
response (it is indeed the very question we are trying to answer in
the present paper), the use of the term perceptual is unfortunate.
In sum: the crucial distinction is not between ‘‘action’’ and
‘‘perception’’, but rather between the participant making a direct
motor response to the stimulus (e.g. grasping it or pointing to it)
and the participant intentionally communicating his subjective
estimation of some stimulus feature by making some kind of
utterance (be it verbal or non-verbal, e.g. by pressing a button or
manual gesture). To mark this important distinction in response
types, we have chosen to use the terms ‘‘motoric responses’’ and
‘‘symbolic responses’’.
Previous findings
When testing whether representations of spatial features driving
motoric and symbolic responses are common or separate,
experimental paradigms have primarily been concerned with the
question of whether select size-contrast illusions or specific types of
brain damage differentially affect motoric and symbolic responses
(for a recent review see [9]).
The rationale behind these experimental paradigms can be
understood as follows: On the one hand, if the two response types
are differentially affected by the illusion or the brain damage, then
separate representations must have produced the responses. On
the other hand, if the two response types are equally affected, then
a common representation must have produced the responses.
Even though studies of size-contrast illusions or specific types of
brain damage have been the most used paradigms, they have not
been the most suited. Despite numerous experimental attempts to
test whether representations are shared or separate, the arguments
of the debate seem to have congealed around methodological
issues (for examples see [10] vs. [11] or [12] vs. [13]).
Recognizing these difficulties in the debate Gegenfurtner and
Franz [14] devised a different approach where they directly
compared manual pointing (a motoric response) to judgments of
location (a symbolic response). In their experiment, the task on
each trial was to first point to a briefly presented Gaussian blob
and then to judge whether the blob appeared to the left or right of
two vertically aligned vertical lines placed above and below the
blob. They found that agreement between pointing and judgments
was well above chance. Based on this result, they concluded that a
common representation of location drives both response types.
Exactly where this representation of location resides is not
known but location is certainly represented as early as V1 in the
retinotopic mapping of visual input from the eyes. What about
representations of more elaborate features such as length and
orientation, which are not directly represented in the retinotopic
mapping? Do symbolic and motoric responses also share a
common representation of these features?
According to Jeannerod’s dual-channel hypothesis of grasping
[15], the reach component of the grasp is independent of the
parameters of the grip itself. This conclusion was based on the
observation that unexpected changes in object size, during a
grasping movement, led to corresponding changes in grip
parameters without influencing the velocity profiles for the reach.
If the parameters of reach (object location) and grip size (object
size) are independently affected by the changes in object size then
there might be differences between how a basic feature such as
location and more elaborate features such as length and
orientation drive symbolic and motoric responses.
Here we apply a paradigm and an analysis similar to the one
used by Gegenfurtner and Franz [14] to the features length and
orientation. The main result shows that the probability that the
two response types are the same is well above chance for both
features at a trial-by-trial basis. This result is fully in agreement
with the theory of a common representation driving both symbolic
and motoric responses to length and orientation. The result would,
however, be very unlikely if symbolic and motoric response types
were driven by separate representations.
Methods
The double response experiment
In the double response experiment participants made two types
of responses during the same trial. First a grasping movement
(motoric response) was made toward a briefly presented bar (the
exposure duration was 47 ms) as soon as the bar was presented on
a monitor and next the length and orientation of the same bar was
reported using a keyboard (symbolic response).
The two response types used in the experiment are defined
operationally as follows:
Motoric response. With minimal training/instruction par-
ticipants were asked to move their index and thumb to the
endpoints of the white bar as soon as the bar was presented (using
about 1 sec of movement-time). The training was minimal because
the act of making a motoric response in the present experiment
was considered equal to the types of motoric responses participants
make on a daily basis throughout their lives.
Symbolic response. Before the experiment proper began,
participants went through an extensive learning process where
each of four different lengths and each of five different orientations
of the bars were associated to the numbers 1, 2, 3, and, 4 for length
and 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 for orientation. Upon presentation of a white
bar a participant would then press e.g. 1 and 4 on a keyboard and
thereby be specifying length 1 and orientation 4. The learning
process was extensive because we wanted to train the participants
until they got so fluent at making a symbolic responses that the
novelty of the task did not interfere with their ability to correctly
report the identity of the briefly presented bar.
Analysis of the association of symbolic and motoric
responses
When analyzing the observed alignment of symbolic and
motoric responses, one must take into account that performance
in both tasks depends on the visibility of the bar (i.e. floor or ceiling
effects). One way to do this is to use a method suggested by Stone
and Krauzlis [16] where expected chance alignments of the two
response types are computed and compared to the observed
number of aligned responses. Gegenfurtner and Franz [14] used
this method to compare observed and expected (chance) alignment
when pointing to a Gaussian blob and judging the location of the
blob on the same trial, but they used a paradigm with binary
response categories. We performed the analysis using a multino-
mial version where all responses were entered into the analysis.
A Common Representation for Action and Perception
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The probability of obtaining the same motoric and symbolic
response by chance Psbcð Þfor a participant x when shown stimulus
n is shown in Equation 1 where pm ið Þ and ps ið Þ are the marginal
probabilities of specifying the stimulus n as belonging to category i
out of all possible categories I for motoric and symbolic responses,
respectively.
Psbc x,nð Þ~
XI
i~1
pm x,n,ið Þps x,n,ið Þ ð1Þ
The number of occurrences where symbolic and motoric
responses were the same (Probability-Same-Observed) was com-
pared to the number of occurrences expected to have happened by
chance (Probability-Same-by-Chance, Psbcð Þ). If the two response
types are driven by independently computed lengths and
orientations then the Probability-Same-Observed equals the
Probability-Same-by-Chance. On the other hand, if a common
representation drives the two response types, Probability-Same-
Observed should be well above Probability-Same-by-Chance.
Ethics Statement
All participants gave their informed consent in writing. The
written consent was given in response to a document informing
them, in detail, about their salary for participating, about what
participating in the experiment consisted of and that, if they did
not want to continue as participants, they could stop participating.
The process is documented using an email-system and in prints of
these emails. The Institutional Review Board at Department of
Psychology, University of Copenhagen approved the study and the
consent procedure and acknowledged that the study was
conducted according to the declaration of Helsinki.
Participants
We initially recruited seven participants (Group 1). Seven
participants can rightfully be considered a small sample size. We
therefore replicated the experiment with another group of seven
participants (Group 2). The replication with Group 2 closely
replicated the findings from Group 1 and thus confirmed the
conclusions drawn from the initial results (see Results section). In
the results section, the results from Group 1 are depicted in both
figures and text. The results of Group 2 are reported in the text
only. Group 1: Five female psychology students (age: 20–23 years.
One left-handed) and two male authors (age 28 and 39 years. One
left-handed). Group 2: Five female psychology students (age: 19–
26 years) and two male psychology students (age 21 and 24 years).
All were right-handed. In both groups all participants had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision. All psychology students were paid
for their participation and were naı¨ve as to the purpose of the
experiment. Group 1 included two authors. Being an author might
have affected the results. The replications with seven naı¨ve
participants (Group 2) show that this justified concern was not a
problem.
Stimulus
The stimuli were always delivered on a 21-inch (19.8-inch
visible) FD Trinitron CRT monitor (Model: Sony GDM-C520K),
set at 85 Hz. The stimulus set used consisted of 20 different white
bars of equal width (0.9 cm.). They had four lengths (6.6, 7.6, 8.6,
and 9.6 cm.) and five orientations. There were both left-handed
and right-handed participants. In order to equate the motoric
response between these two groupings the bars were always
oriented such that, for the right-hand group, the top end of the bar
was inclined toward the left and for the left-handed group the top
end of the bar was inclined towards the right. So for left-handed
participants the orientations were 30u, 40u, 50u, 60u, and 70u. For
the right-handed participants the orientations were 150u, 140u,
130u, 120u, and 110u. In pilot studies the size of the angular
separation between the five different orientations was adjusted to
be similar to the size between the four lengths in terms of difficulty
when making a symbolic response (but, in terms of difficulty, we
did not attempt to precisely equate a unit change in orientation to
a unit change in length). Bars were presented at arms length for
47 ms (at 85 Hz a single frame lasted about 11.76 ms so four
frames corresponded to about 47 ms). Pilot studies showed that
this exposure duration was sufficient. Bars were presented on a
black computer screen (one at a time on either the left or right side
of a central fixation mark (a white cross) with the center of the bar
located 7.5 cm. from the fixation mark). Because the length of the
participants’ arms differed, the precise visual degrees of the stimuli
are not reported. A contrast adjustment procedure lowered the
intensity of the bar until barely visible. When lowering the
intensity of the bar, the aim was not to adjust the luminance to
produce a certain proportion correct responses for length and
orientation. The aim was to make sure that both features were
sufficiently difficult to report correctly (not so hard that reporting
them correctly would be at chance and not so easy that they would
be reported correctly in every trial). The adjustment process is
described in the procedure. The experiment took place in a semi-
darkened room. E-prime (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh,
PA) was used for stimulus presentation and recording of the
responses when participants were making symbolic responses.
Apparatus
An Optotrak 3D investigator system (Northern Digital Inc.,
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada) was used to record movements and
positions of the hand and fingers. At the beginning of a session,
three infrared diodes were attached close to the tip of both the
index finger and thumb. Participants then made slow and precise
motoric responses to all 20 bars to each side of the fixation mark
one at a time several times. The diodes were adjusted so that at
least one pair of diodes (one on the thumb and one on the index
finger) was registered by the Optotrak sensors when touching each
of the 20 bars to both sides.
Procedure
The seven participants in Group 1 completed two sessions. Each
session consisted of five parts taking approximately two hours to
complete:
Part 1. The participants were initially familiarized with the 20
bars presented one at a time to each side of the fixation mark in
random order (this procedure was repeated three times in three
blocks producing a total of 120 trials). Each bar was presented for
as long as the participants needed while they fixated the fixation
mark. Below the fixation mark the correct symbolic responses were
displayed (1, 2, 3 or 4 for length and 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 for orientation).
Correct symbolic responses were always displayed with length as
the first number and orientation the second. (luminance
(CIE(1931)) of bars = 1.13 cd/m2, luminance of the black
background >0 cd/m2 (measured with the Cambridge Research
Systems ColorCAL II).
Part 2. Next, all 20 bars were displayed one at a time to each
side of the fixation in random order (this procedure was repeated
three times in three blocks producing a total of 120 trials)
(luminance (CIE(1931)) of bars = 1.13 cd/m2, luminance of the
black background >0 cd/m2). Presentation time was 47 ms and
participants made a symbolic response after each presentation.
A Common Representation for Action and Perception
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Their answer was indicated beneath the fixation mark and
afterwards the correct answer was indicated beneath their
symbolic response. Correct symbolic responses were always
displayed with length as the first number and orientation the
second. This was also the order in which participants had to
respond to the features of the bar.
Part 3. The calibration procedure. The orientation of the
motoric response is defined as the angle between the horizontal
plane and the virtual line between the index finger and thumb.
Length is defined as the distance between the index and thumb
finger (see Figure 1). Notice, though, that when attaching the
infrared diodes close to the tip of both the index finger and thumb,
the exact placement of the pair of diodes will vary between sessions
and between participants. Therefore, in a single motoric response,
the raw measure of distance between diodes and the angle between
the horizontal plane and the virtual line between index finger and
thumb cannot be directly related to a given length and orientation
of a bar. That is, we can never know the true orientation category
or length category to which a participant’s raw motoric response
corresponds. To be useful, the motoric responses need to be
categorized using a classifier.
Before the motoric responses could be classified into the
categories of the stimulus, a calibration procedure was performed.
All 20 bars were presented once to both sides of the fixation mark
in random order (this procedure was repeated two times in two
blocks producing in total 80 trials). The bars were visible until the
next trial was initiated and participants made a slow (about 1 sec.)
and precise motoric response by placing their fingers on the
endpoints of the bar. This way a given length and orientation was
repeatedly measured 20 times. (luminance (CIE(1931)) of bars
= 1.13 cd/m2, luminance of the black background >0 cd/m2).
All subsequent motor responses of lengths and orientations were
classified with a Naı¨ve Bayes classifier [17], into four categories for
length and five categories for orientation, using the prior obtained
calibration data as training set (assuming equal prior probability
among all response categories).
Part 4. Next, all 20 bars were presented once to both sides of
the fixation mark in random order (this procedure was repeated
four times in four blocks producing a total of 160 trials).
Participants initiated presentation of the bar by pressing space.
A one second delay was inserted between pressing space and
presenting the bar. Again presentation time was 47 ms. In Part 4
stimulus luminance varied from trial to trial in an adaptive
staircase manner.
If only one feature was incorrect the luminance was left
unchanged. If both features were correct, the luminance was
decreased and if both features were incorrect the luminance was
increased. Increase and decrease were made according to the
function:
Lnz1~Ln{
10
log nz1ð Þ Z{0:5ð Þ ð2Þ
In the above equation Ln is the current luminance level in RGB
values and Lnz1is the adjusted new luminance for next trial, n is
trial number and Z takes the value 0 if both features were incorrect
and 1 if both features were correct (modified from [18]).
Each time all 20 bars had been presented on both sides the
function was restarted but with the last RGB setting inserted in the
function. After each trial their answer was indicated beneath the
fixation mark, but no feedback was given in terms of correct/
incorrect.
Part 5. Next all 20 bars were presented once to both sides of
the fixation mark in random order (this procedure was repeated
four times in four blocks producing a total of 160 trials). The RGB
level was fixed at the RGB level reached in Part 4. Part 5
constituted the measurement taken, in each trial, when making
both a motoric and symbolic response. Each trial began when
participants were ready and pressed space. After 1 second the
white bar was presented for 47 ms at the RGB level reached in the
adjustment in part 4. The RGB values had a mean luminance
value of 0.02 cd/m2 and ranged between 0.01 and 0.06 cd/m2. As
soon as the bar was presented participants moved their fingers
from a resting position next to the keyboard to the endpoints of the
bar, touching the screen and back again to the resting position.
Immediately thereafter they made a symbolic response of length
first and then orientation. The symbolic response was non-
speeded. Each participant completed the above procedure twice in
two sessions producing a total of 320 double response trials.
The luminance of the text, in all instructions given in the five
different parts of a single session, was set at 1.13 cd/m2 to avoid
adaptation that could interfere with the upcoming stimulus that
was barely visible. The fixation mark always had the same
luminance as the stimulus. For Group 2 Part 3 was performed
before Part 1. Group 2 also completed two sessions. The median
interval between the two sessions was eight days for Group 1 and
four days for Group 2. According to a two-tailed t-test comparing
the interval between session 1 and 2 for each participant in Group
1 to the interval between session 1 and 2 for each participant in
Group 2 the interval was not significantly different for the two
groups (t(12) 1.7447, P = 0.12).
Results
Categorization of motoric responses
Figure 2 shows, for Group 1, the categorizations of motoric
responses of lengths and orientations based on the Naı¨ve Bayes
classifier. Classification of orientation and length is performed after
rejecting all trials 63 standard deviations from the group mean.
For Group 1, there were 28 missing symbolic length responses and
25 missing symbolic orientation responses (all 25 missing
orientation responses coincided with the 28 missing length
responses). Also, for Group 1, there were 58 missing motoric
responses (there were no motoric responses where only one feature
was missing). 9 of the missing symbolic responses did not coincide
with the 58 missing motoric responses. Therefore, there were 67
missing double responses out of 2240. For Group 2, there were 15
missing symbolic length responses and 6 missing symbolic
orientation responses (all 6 missing orientation responses coincided
with the 15 missing length responses). Also, for Group 2, there
were 28 missing motoric responses (there were no motoric
responses where only one feature was missing). One of the missing
Figure 1. A motoric response to the length and orientation of a
bar.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094744.g001
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symbolic responses did not coincide with the 28 missing motoric
responses. Therefore, there were 29 missing double responses out
of 2240.
Given that we can never know the true orientation category or
length category of a participants motoric response (see Procedure:
Part 3), we cannot asses the classifier performance in the classical
sense that involve supervised testing of how well it performs for
each category. However, we can look at how well the participants
perform the task given the classifier at hand. If we assume the
classifier works no better than chance (randomly chooses a length
and orientation category for each response), the participant
performance would not exceed 25% for length and 20% for
orientation. The proportion correct for lengths were: Group
1(0.50, 0.40, 0.39, 0.56), Group 2 (0.64, 0.34, 0.34, 0.66) and for
orientations: Group 1 (0.85, 0.53, 0.60, 0.54, 0.84), Group 2 (0.84,
0.51, 0.61, 0.65, 0.85). To test if the proportions were above
chance, we performed a binominal test for each length and
orientation category for each participant. We then transformed the
derived p-values from these tests into x2-square values to test the
effect across participants [19]. All of these tests were highly
significant, thus, the classifier is performing well above chance
level.
To further evaluate the classifier’s performance, we analyzed if
participants’ proportion correct was significantly different between
motoric and symbolic responses. We evaluated each category with
a paired t-test statistic for both groups (N = 7 in each group), H0:
Performance(motoric) = Performance(symbolic). For length:
Group 1 (p = 0.81, 0.26, 0.08, 0.06), Group 2 (p = 0.2, 0.16,
0.007*, 0.16) and for orientation: Group 1 (p = 0.67, 0.9, 0.69,
0.26, 0.35), Group 2 (p = 0.11, 1, 0.7, 0.1, 0.38) (two-tailed,
a= 0.05). Only one condition show a significantly different
performance between motoric and symbolic response evaluated
with a parametric test. In Table 1, overall proportion correct
length and orientation are shown for Group 1 and Group 2.
In order to examine if there were any differences between the
overall proportion correct motoric and symbolic responses
depicted in Table 1 a two-way repeated measures ANOVA was
performed on the proportion correct motoric and symbolic
responses for overall length and overall orientation (response
type(symbolic vs. motoric) x (feature type(length vs. orientation)).
For Group 1, there was a main effect of feature type
(F(1,6) = 134.252, p,0.0001, gp2 = 0.957); no main effect of
response type (F(1,6) = 0.041, p = 0.846); and no interaction
F(1,6) = 0.115, p = 0.746. For Group 2, there was a main effect
of feature type (F(1,6) = 39.761, p = 0.001, gp2 = 0.869); no main
effect of response type (F(1,6) = 0.734, p = 0.424); and no
interaction F(1,6) = 3.389, p = 0.115. Collapsing Group 1 and 2
produced the same result with a main effect of feature type
(F(1,13) = 134.093, p,0.0001, gp2 = 0.912); no main effect of
response type (F(1,13) = 0.336, p = 0.527); and no interaction
F(1,13) = 2.055, p = 0.175. These analyses tell us that the classifier
introduces no additional error to the classification of the motoric
responses than the one already there.
The Naı¨ve Bayes classifier was chosen because it assumes
independency among categories and imposes a uniform prior –
hence on its own, it introduces no bias. However, this does not
mean that there is no response bias in the motoric responses. In
fact, there is response bias in both motoric and symbolic responses
for both length and orientation. This can be shown with a x2-
square test evaluating the extent to which the distribution of
motoric or symbolic responses to length or orientation differ from
a completely unbiased distribution. In a completely unbiased
distribution, the expected number of responses for each length
category is (total number of length responses)/(4) and (total
number of orientation responses)/(5) for each orientation category.
We performed the x2-square test on each participant, summed the
x2-values across participants and from this value determined if
distributions of motoric or symbolic responses to length or
orientation differed significantly from the unbiased expected
distributions. In all instances, they did. (Group 1 (motoric length
x2 (21) = 148, p,0.0001); motoric orientation x2 (28) = 163, p,
0.0001), symbolic length x2 (21) = 475, p,0.0001), symbolic
orientation x2 (28) = 138, p,0.0001)) and (Group 2 (motoric
length x2 (21) = 114, p,0.0001); motoric orientation x2 (28) = 97,
p,0.0001), symbolic length x2 (21) = 245, p,0.0001), symbolic
orientation x2 (28) = 121, p,0.0001)).
Response-time
On average, participants in Group 1 used 1.289 seconds
(SD = 0.16) from presentation of the bar and until touching the
screen. In the replication performed using Group 2 the reaction
times had an average of 1.275 seconds (SD = 0.23). A two tailed
independent samples t-test showed that the response-times of the
groups were not significantly different (t(12) = 0.135, p= 0.89).
Figure 2. Categorization of motoric responses (for Group 1). Bars represent the average number of motoric responses to length and
orientation across seven participants (a total of 2173 data points (2240 minus the 67 missing) categorized with a Naı¨ve Bayes classifier. Top plot
shows categorizations of length and bottom plot shows categorizations of orientation. Error-bars are SEM’s across participants.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094744.g002
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Within the context of the current experimental design, the
response-times can be considered adequate: they are neither to
fast nor to slow. On the one hand, when participants were
instructed on how to perform the motoric response, they were told
to move their index and thumb to the endpoints of the white bar as
soon as the bar was presented using about 1 sec of movement-
time. We wanted to avoid that participants viewed the motoric
response as a fast-paced reaction-time task because the symbolic
response, to which it was compared, was unspeeded. On the other
hand, we did not want the motoric response to be performed in
‘‘slow motion’’ since this would have introduced a delay of several
seconds between removal of the white bar and the final position of
the fingers on the screen of the monitor. For reasons discussed
later in the section A note on the use of brief exposure durations, such a
delay would have been problematic.
Above chance agreement between symbolic and
motoric responses
In Figures 3a and 3b, the Probability-Same-Observed is plotted
on the y-axis and the Probability-Same-by-Chance (derived from
equation 1) is plotted on the x-axis (for Group 1). Figure 3a
contains 28 data-points 7 participants | 4 Lengthsð Þ and each
data-point consists of 80 trials (2 sessions of 160 trials each/4
lengths). Figure 3b has 35 data-points
7 participants | 5 Orientationsð Þ and each data-point consists
of 64 trials (2 sessions of 160 trials each/5 orientations). If data-
points fall on the diagonal y = x line, symbolic and motoric
responses are no more in agreement than what can be expected by
chance. Any point falling above this line suggests that symbolic
and motoric responses are more in agreement than what can be
expected by chance. For length almost all data-points lie well
above chance and for orientation the majority lies above chance.
We compared Probability-Same-by-Chance and Probability-
Same-Observed values for both length and orientation using the
Wilcoxon signed rank test (for both Group 1 and Group 2). For
Group 1 both tests showed that mean Probability-Same-Observed
was significantly above mean Probability-Same-by-Chance
(Length: Probability-Same-by-Chance (mean = 0.3444) and Prob-
ability-Same-Observed (mean = 0.4821) W = 404, p,0.001; Ori-
entation: Probability-Same-by-Chance (mean = 0.5391) and Prob-
ability-Same-Observed (mean = 0.5997) W = 561, p,0.001). For
Group 2 both tests showed a replication of the findings in Group 1.
For Group 2 mean Probability-Same-Observed was significantly
above mean Probability-Same-by-Chance (Length: Probability-
Same-by-Chance (mean = 0.3732) and Probability-Same-Observed
(mean = 0.5165) W = 406, p,0.001; Orientation: Probability-
Same-by-Chance (mean = 0.5253) and Probability-Same-Observed
(mean = 0.5765) W = 520, p,0.001).
On the distribution of proportion correct and number of
responses along the four lengths and the five
orientations: comparing symbolic and motoric responses
To examine our data further, we tested whether motoric and
symbolic responses showed different patterns of proportion correct
or categorization biases. We used a x2-test to compare the
distributions of proportion correct symbolic and motoric responses
along the four length categories or along the five orientation
categories. We performed the x2-test for each participant and
summed the x2-values to test the effect across participants (within
Group 1 or 2). (Group 1 (length x2 (21) = 101, p,0.0001);
orientation x2 (28) = 31, p,0.31), and (Group 2 (length x2
(21) = 114, p,0.0001); orientation x2 (28) = 44, p,0.023). We
also use a x2-test to compare the distributions of the number of
motoric and symbolic responses along either the four lengths or
the five orientations. Again we performed the x2-test for each
participant and sum the x2-values to test the effect across
participant (within Group 1 or 2). (Group 1 (length x2
(21) = 355, p,0.0001); orientation x2 (28) = 107, p,0.0001), and
(Group 2 (length x2 (21) = 378, p,0.0001); orientation x2
(28) = 105, p,0.0001).
Thus, three out of four distributions of proportion correct
responses were significantly different between response types and
all the distributions of the number of responses (along the four
lengths and the five orientations) were significantly different. Can
these differences by themselves tell us whether or not a common
representation drives the two response types? As noted in the
introduction, there are two versions of the perception-action
model by Milner and Goodale: A weak segregation version and a
strong segregation version. Evidence showing differences in error
patterns and categorization biases for motoric and symbolic
responses might, on the face of it, be taken as evidence for the
strong segregation version, but the very same differences in error
patterns and categorization biases are just as likely to occur under
the weak segregation version. The reason is that even in the weak
segregation version the visual signals must at some point travel
separate routes in order to transform the common representation
of the spatial features of objects into a format suitable for making
either a motoric or a symbolic response. According to the weak
segregation version, information from a common representation is
therefore fed into two segregated streams. Within these streams
they must be transformed into motoric responses (dorsal) and
symbolic responses (ventral). Independent sources of noise can
affect the separate transformations and the two segregated
transformations will sometimes be erroneous and can have
different biases. This means that there can be differences between
distributions of motoric and symbolic responses (both in number
and in accuracy) even when the responses originate in a common
representation.
Table 1. Mean proportion correct and standard deviations () for length and orientation across participants in a given group for a
given response type.
Proportion correct (%)
Response type Group 1 (N=7) Group 2 (N=7)
Length Motoric 46.2 (67.9) 49.3 (66.9)
Symbolic 47.3 (67.4) 50.2 (66.4)
Orientation Motoric 66.8 (610.5) 69.3 (65.3)
Symbolic 66.5 (64.1) 63.6 (67.4)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094744.t001
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To decide between the two versions of the perception-action
model, we must instead look beyond the noise and the response
bias that will be a part of the transformation of the representation
of the bar into each of the two response types, also according to the
weak segregation model. This is what we have done in Figure 3. If
the strong segregation version of the perception-action model was
correct and each of the two response types were based on
independently computed representations of length (or orientation),
then the Probability-Same-by-Chance should be equal to the
Probability-Same-Observed. This is not what we find. Instead we
find that the Probability-Same-Observed, for a given participant
when shown a particular category of a feature, is well above the
Probability-Same-by-Chance.
Independent feature processing during both motoric
and symbolic responses
If motoric and symbolic responses are driven by a common
representation then basic characteristics of the representation
should be reflected in both types of responses.
One example of this is the finding that the visual representation
used to guide motoric responses in the absence of visual feedback
shows the same decay characteristics (exponential decay) as
typically found when asking participants to perform symbolic
responses [20].
Another way to analyze the internal structure of a representa-
tion of an object is in terms of whether or not the features
composing the object are processed dependently or independently.
That two features of one object are processed independently
should be understood as follows: In any given trial, the probability
of making a correct response to one of the features will depend on
the marginal probability of making a correct response to that
feature only. It will not depend on whether the response to the
other feature was correct. If it did depend on whether the other
feature was specified correctly, then the two features were
processed dependently of each other. Even though the specific
pairing of length and orientation for a symbolic response has not,
to our knowledge, been analyzed in terms of independence, many
other feature-pairs have been examined. It is an established
hallmark of symbolic responses to features of an object that they
are processed independently (e.g. [21]). We therefore expect that,
in terms of correctness, symbolic responses to length will be
independent from symbolic responses to orientation.
In order to answer the question of independence, all data from
Group 1 was converted into correct/incorrect answers and these
answers were entered into a multinomial test of independence
[21]. Seven participants had completed a total of 14 blocks (of 160
trials) for both symbolic and motoric responses. Therefore we
conducted 28 multinomial tests of independence. A non-significant
p-value (above alpha = 0.05) was used as a measure indicating
independence. In all 28 instances, the multinomial test of
independence indicated independent processing of the two
features. The results from Group 2 were also analyzed using the
multinomial test of independence. This also produced 28 non-
significant p-values. Thus, 56 times out of 56, the multinomial tests
of independence failed to find a significant dependence within a
given response type,between correct/incorrect judgments of length
and orientation of a stimulus.
The results of the multinomial test can be illustrated by
comparing the probability of getting both length and orientation
correct in a given trial to the observed probability.
In Figure 4, this chance probability of getting both length and
orientation correct is compared to the observed probability of
getting both correct and depicted separately for motoric and
symbolic responses (for Group 1). The observed probability is well
predicted by the chance probability. Therefore, length and
orientation are specified independently in both the motoric and
the symbolic responses. This finding was replicated using Group 2.
Standard deviation of motoric responses to briefly
presented 2D objects does not follow Weber’s law
As mentioned in the introduction, the perception-action model
is a leading theory in the ongoing debate concerning the degree of
Figure 3. Comparison of Probability-Same-by-Chance and Probability-Same-Observed for length (A) and orientation (B) (for Group
1). In Panel A the black circles show the probability of obtaining the same motoric and symbolic response by chance (x-axis) compared to the
observed probability (y-axis). Data-points falling above the red y = x line indicate instances where symbolic and motoric responses are in agreement
above chance. Panel B shows the same for orientation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094744.g003
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segregation of the neural processing streams underpinning
symbolic and motoric responses. In the perception-action model,
visual input separate into two streams at a low level in the visual
system (in V1+; the + is from [22] and we take it to mean ‘‘early
visual cortex not otherwise specified’’). One stream flows along a
dorsal route where visual information is transformed and
represented in a format supposedly suitable for connecting with
the motor system. That is, suitable for performing actions on
objects based on vision which according to the perception-action
model necessitates a metric in egocentric coordinates. Another
stream flows along a ventral route where visual information is
transformed and represented in a format suitable for connecting
with memory systems and conscious awareness. In order to do this,
this stream is using a metric with more emphasis on objects relative
to other objects [1].
It has been argued that the dorsal stream, thought to drive
motoric responses, is only properly activated when grasping real
3D objects that are visible until the grasp is completed (see the
sections in the discussion titled: A note on the use of brief exposure
durations and a note on the use of 2D stimuli for further discussion of
these topics). According to these arguments the brief exposure
durations and 2D stimuli we used might have failed to activate the
dorsal stream. To investigate if the dorsal stream is fully activated
by the briefly presented 2D stimuli used in the present work we
analyzed the variability of the motoric responses to length as
lengths were increased (lengths were 6.6, 7.6, 8.6, and 9.6 cm.).
The analysis was inspired by the finding that grasp precision of 3D
objects does not follow Weber’s law [23]. This has been proposed
as a marker for dorsal stream processing [24,25] as opposed to
symbolic responses to length which do follow Weber’s law [23,26]
and are thought to be driven by ventral stream processing. If the
motoric responses in the present experiment also follows Weber’s
law then it can be argued that ventral stream processing are
driving the motoric responses to 2D objects. If so a well-above-
chance agreement of the two response types, in the present
experiment, is expected since they might both be driven by the
same representation of length situated in the ventral stream [1–
5,24]. According to Weber’s law, the just-noticeable difference between
two stimuli increases as the magnitude of the stimuli increases
(measured using symbolic responses!). Of course, when the just-
noticeable difference between stimuli increases for a participant, the
standard deviations of his estimates of these stimuli will also
increase. This means that if the motoric responses in the present
experiment were driven by a ventral stream representation then
the standard deviations of the responses of the bars should increase
as the lengths are increased. Figure 5, depicting the case for Group
1, show that this does not seem to be the case.
Is feedback from motoric responses affecting symbolic
responses in the double response experiment?
The most parsimonious interpretation of the results of the
double response experiment is that a common representation
drives both responses. Nevertheless, one alternative interpretation
is that separate representations drive each response type but that
visual information from seeing the hand making the motoric
response (or feedback from the locomotor system when making a
motoric response) is somehow influencing the symbolic response in
Figure 4. Comparing the chance probability and the observed probability of getting both length and orientation correct within
response types (for Group 1). In each panel the y-value of a data-point is the proportion of trials, for a given participant responding to a given
combination of length and orientation, where both length and orientation were correct. Therefore, in total, there are 140 data-points in each panel
(seven participants performing each of the 20 combinations of length and orientation). Each data-point is based on 16 trials. The x-value of a data-
point is derived from a model of independence. It is calculated by multiplying the marginal probability of getting a specific length correct (across all
orientations) with the marginal probability of getting a specific orientation correct (across all lengths). The specific length and orientation is chosen so
that it corresponds to the combination of length and orientation used to derive the y-value. The red line is y = x and the grey line is the best linear fit.
The lines show how closely matched the observed probability is to the chance probability. For motoric responses in Group 1 the slope of the grey line
was 1.023 (and intersected the y-axis at 0.000). For symbolic responses in Group 1 the slope of the grey line was 1.055 (and intersected the y-axis at
0.0032). For motoric responses in Group 2 the slope of the grey line was 1.011 (and intersected the y-axis at 0.01). For symbolic responses in Group 2
the slope of the grey line was 1.096 (and intersected the y-axis at 0.0252).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094744.g004
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a way that drives the probability of making the same symbolic and
motoric response well-above chance. Before we consider this
alternative interpretation, it is important to point out that the
participant would not know if using the feedback from seeing or
feeling the hand making the motoric response would increase the
probability of getting the symbolic response right. Therefore, even
if possible, there would be no incentive to use the feedback
information.
In order to evaluate quantitatively the likelihood of the
alternative interpretation, it is necessary to consider exactly how
visual information of the motoric responses could have influenced
the symbolic responses so that the probability of making the same
symbolic and motoric response was driven well-above chance.
First of all, we assume that if the visual information of the hand
making the motoric response is to determine a symbolic response,
it is necessary to learn to form an association between the visual
information of the hand making the motoric response and a
symbolic response. After all, it was necessary to help participants,
during the training phase, to learn to form associations between
the visual information from the presentation of the bar and the
symbolic response. In designing the experimental procedure for
the training phase, we have tried to make it as hard as possible to
learn to form an association between the visual information of the
hand making the motoric response and the symbolic response by
choosing that no motoric responses were to be made in the trials of
the training phase where participants practiced making the
symbolic responses. The only motoric responses made during
the training phase were those performed when adjusting the
diodes for proper registration by the Optotrak sensors and when
calibrating the grasps (see procedure). During these motoric
responses the correct symbolic responses were not revealed.
Nevertheless, during the double response trials (performed after
the training phase), the participants might have been able to learn
to appropriately associate the visual information of the motoric
responses with a symbolic response. An appropriate association would
be one able to influence the symbolic responses to belong to the
same category as the motoric response would turn out to belong
to, when later analyzed with the Naı¨ve Bayes classifier. The
keyword here is learning. Learning to appropriately associate is a
process that develops in strength and precision over time. So, over
time, the participants should become better and better at
appropriately associating the visual information from the hand making
the motoric response with a symbolic response. Consequently, as
the learning increases in strength and precision, the probability of
making the same symbolic and motoric response should also be
increasing. So the question is: did this probability increase? Part 5
of the experimental procedure consisted of four blocks and within
blocks all 20 possible combinations of length and orientation were
shown once to both sides of the fixation mark (in random order). If
participants, over time, become better and better at appropriately
associating the visual information from the hand making the motoric
response with the correct symbolic response, then the difference
between the probability-same-observed and the probability-same-by-chance
should increase systematically from block 1 to block 4. In Figure 6
it is clearly shown that no such increase takes place (for Group 1).
In fact, for both length and orientation, the slope is the opposite of
what should be expected. Thus, in part 5 of the experimental
procedure, the alignment of motoric and symbolic responses is not
increasing over time. Consequently, the well-above chance
probability of making the same symbolic and motoric response
(Figure 3) is not observed because the participants transfer visual
information from seeing the hand to the systems deciding which
symbolic response to make.
Discussion
Experimental findings
When presenting a bar, the sensory information projected into
the visual system does not in itself represent the length and
orientation of the bar. Length and orientation is something that
has to be computed. According to the strong segregation version of
the perception/action model the visual information (i.e. informa-
tion before computing representations of length and orientation)
reach segregated processing modules underlying symbolic and
motoric responses. This means that length and orientation has to
be computed independently within each module. If so then the
agreement between computations in each of these segregated
processing streams should be at chance. Therefore, the present
finding (Figure 3) of a highly significant well-above chance
agreement for both length and orientation goes against the strong
segregation version. The weak segregation version can easily
accommodate the findings reported in Figure 3 and as such
indicates that a common representation drives both response
types.
Given that a common representation drives both response types
then why, one might ask, are the responses not in full agreement
Figure 5. The standard deviations of motoric responses to
length for Group 1. The histogram above shows the standard
deviations of motoric responses, from the double response experiment,
at four different lengths. Each bar is the mean standard deviation
calculated pr. participant (N = 7). Each bar is based on approximately
560 motoric responses. Error-bars are SEM’s across participants. The y-
axis is in mm. A straight line fitted through the four mean standard
deviations had a slope of 0.0029 mm (and intersected the y-axis at
8.8 mm). For Group 2 the best fitting straight line even had a negative
slope of20.3 mm (and intersected the y-axis at 13 mm). The analysis of
standard deviations replicates earlier findings using 3D objects [23 see
figure 1A] by showing that standard deviations of motoric responses to
length, as length is increased, does not follow Weber’s law. In fact, a
slope of 0.0029 mm means that the averages of the standard deviations
are almost identical across the different lengths used. The findings in
[23], showing that the standard deviations of grasping 3D objects does
not follow Weber’s law, was based on a condition where 11 participants
grasped 3D objects with lengths of 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 cm (note that in
the study it is erroneously reported that 13 participants completed the
condition). In [23] a one-way ANOVA was conducted (six lengths and 11
participants) and reported as F(5,60),1. Based on the non-significant
result of the one-way ANOVA the authors in [23] concluded that the
standard deviations for grasping was not affected by object size. In our
study a total of 14 participants (Group 1+Group 2) grasped 2D objects
with lengths of equal increments (6.6, 7.6, 8.6, 9.6 cm). Having a similar
number of participants and lengths of equal increments we also
conducted a one-way ANOVA with a result similar to what was reported
in [23] [F(3,52) = 0.105,p = 0.957]. The observed violation of Weber’s law,
during grasping, has been proposed as a marker for dorsal stream
processing [24,25] Thus, according to this proposal, the dorsal stream
drove the motoric responses in the present experiment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094744.g005
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on all trials? They need not be in full agreement because other
factors than the common representation can determine a response.
Errors when transforming the common representation into a given
response type is one such factor. Also, both types of responses are
partly under participants control and can be affected by biases this
way. Unconscious biases not under the participants control could
also affect the responses and drive them apart.
As can be seen in Table 1 the proportion correct motoric and
symbolic responses were very similar. This is further supported by
the more detailed analysis comparing (separately for Group 1 and
Group 2) the proportion correct motoric and symbolic responses
for each category of either length or orientation. This more
detailed analysis revealed that only 1 out of 18 paired t-tests
showed a significant difference between the two response types.
This indicates that the classifications of motoric responses were
accurate and validates the method used to gauge length and
orientation from motoric responses. Furthermore, it corresponds
well with the idea that a common representation drives both
response types.
When looking at the responses to length and orientation, for
each response type separately, we found clear evidence for
independent processing of these features. In fact, the observed
probability of getting both length and orientation correct, when
making either symbolic or motoric responses, is well predicted by
the chance probability of getting both length and orientation
correct. That length and orientation are processed independently
within both response types is not a direct proof of a common
representation since the independent processing could arise
independently in two segregated streams (see: the redundant illusion
hypothesis [27]). Nevertheless, it corresponds well with the idea of a
common representation. Furthermore, since the question of
whether or not features are reported independently during a
motoric responses, to our knowledge, has never before been raised,
the finding of independence in motoric responses is in itself an
important step forward in the understanding of visual represen-
tations driving stimulus directed actions. Apparently, even though
grasping an object is perceived as a single unified action (try
introspecting on how it feels to grasp something yourself) the
Figure 6. The analysis portrayed in Figure 6 was made because it was conceivable that the well-above chance probability (reported
in Figure 3) was driven by transfer of visual information, from seeing the hand making the motoric response, to the systems
deciding which symbolic response to make. For such a transfer to occur, though, an association must be formed between visual information,
from seeing the hand making the motoric response and a symbolic response. Figure 6 shows that, during the double response trials, no associations
are formed between visual information, from seeing the hand making a motoric response and the corresponding symbolic response. If such
associations were formed then the associations should become stronger and more precise over time as part of a learning process. This means that
the well-above chance probability of making the same symbolic and motoric response should be increasing over time as well as one moves from
block 1–4 during part 5 of the experimental procedure where the double responses are made. As can be readily observed, from visual inspection of
the simple linear regression fitted to the data (red line), the difference between the observed probability (P(obs)) and the predicted probability
(P(pred)) is not increasing as one moves from block 1 to block 4. The data-points were created by reanalyzing the data reported in Figure 3 (for Group
1). Only data from session 1 is part of the analysis (160 trials pr. participant). The 160 trials were presented in four blocks. Within blocks all
combinations of length and orientation were shown. For length, each of the data-point consists of 10 trials (160 trials/4 blocks/4 lengths) and for
orientation each data-point consists of 8 trials (160 trials/4 blocks/5 orientations). For Group 1 the slope of the red line was negative for both length
(20.025) and orientation (20.0214). For Group 1, a one-way ANOVA found no significant effect of blocks for either length or orientation (Length:
F(3,108) = 1.44, p = 0.236; Orientation: F(3,136) = 1.93, p = 0.127). For Group 2 the slope of the red line was negative for length (20.057) but slightly
positive for orientation (0.0089). A one-way ANOVA did find a significant effect of blocks on the negative slope for length (F(3,108) = 2.89, p = 0.0387)
but no significant effect of blocks on the slightly positive slope for orientation (F(3,136) = 2.32, p = 0.0777). Thus, feedback, from the hand making the
motoric response, was not driving the well-above chance occurrence of identical motoric and symbolic responses reported in Figure 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094744.g006
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necessary computations driving the motoric response to length and
orientation are made independently.
According to the perception-action model a ventral stream in
the brain drives symbolic responses and a dorsal stream drives
motoric responses. Proponents of the perception-action model
argue that the dorsal stream is only properly activated by real 3D
objects that are visible during most of the motoric response.
According to these arguments the brief exposure durations and 2D
stimuli used in the double response experiment might have failed
to activate the dorsal stream. The proponents of the perception-
action model have also argued that the standard deviation of
motoric responses to length, as length is increased, does not
increase. This is a violation of Weber’s law according to which the
standard deviations of symbolic responses to length increase as
length is increased. Because of this, the proponents of the
perception-action model suggest that when standard deviations
of motoric responses violate Weber’s law it should be seen as a
marker for dorsal stream processing. In Figure 5 we show that
motoric response to length violate Weber’s law. Thus, dorsal
stream processing probably drove the motoric responses in the
double response experiment.
When contemplating possible confounds in the double response
experiment one confound readily presents itself: perhaps the
symbolic responses were not always based on the visual impression
of the bar. Perhaps instead, sometimes, the symbolic responses
were based on the visual impression of seeing the hand making the
motoric response to the bar. After all, participants did see their
hand making the motoric response immediately before making the
symbolic response. Maybe, somehow, this affected the symbolic
response? If so, this could have aligned the two response types thus
causing the well-above chance finding. For this to occur, though,
the participants would have had to learn to associate the visual
impression of the motoric response with appropriate symbolic
response categories and this would have had to be a learning
process. Since learning processes generally increase in strength and
precision over time the size of the well-above chance finding
should also increase over time. In Figure 6 we show that the well-
above chance finding does not increase over time. Consequently,
the result in Figure 6 refutes the idea of visual impressions of
motoric responses driving symbolic responses. The result in Figure
6, though, is in perfect agreement with the hypothesis of a
common representation of length and orientation driving the well-
above chance finding.
We note that the present work does not allow for a precise
neural definition of what is meant by ‘‘common representation’’.
Schenk, Franz and Bruno [12] suggest a model, opposed to the
separate representation model, where visual information is shared
across pathways’’ (i.e. dorsal and ventral red.). Conceptually
though, it does not make sense to differentiate between such a
model, where different representations in two streams affect each
other, and a model where one common set of brain areas,
supporting the representation, drive both response types. Assum-
ing that representations, in general, are distributed over processing
networks (either large or small) both models portray a single
distributed representation shared by both response types.
Relation to the perception-action model by Milner and
Goodale
Many investigations of the coupling between symbolic and
motoric responses have related their experimental results to a
perception-action model developed by Milner and Goodale [1,4,5]
here called the perception-action model. We will also follow this
trend, but in doing so point out that there are (at least) two versions
of the perception-action model. In one version (here called the
strong segregation version) the representations of length and orientation
driving motoric responses are computed in a dorsal stream isolated
from representations of length and orientation driving symbolic
responses that are computed in a ventral stream [1–3,6,28,29]. In
another version (here called the weak segregation version) the
representations of length and orientation driving motoric and
symbolic responses are computed before the streams segregate. In
the weak segregation version, a common representation of length and
orientation is therefore fed to the two streams [4–8].
In the perception-action model, representations of spatial object
features are processed in both streams. This property of the model
clearly distinguishes it from earlier dual stream models such as the
Ungerleider and Mishkin model where location, a spatial feature
of an object, is processed in a dorsal stream and the identity of the
object is processed in a ventral stream [1,9]. Even so, usually, the
authors of the perception-action model do not specify whether or
not representations of spatial features driving motoric and
symbolic responses (such as size, orientation or location) are
formed before or after the streams segregate. It only states that the
two streams share visual information from V1+. But whether or
not the visual information from V1+ contains a representation of a
given feature of an object is often underdetermined. Goodale and
Milner write: ‘‘the two streams share common inputs from early
retinotopic cortical areas (orientation, location, size, etc), so that
processing of these visual features is not the absolute province of
one or other stream’’ (Goodale & Milner, 2010, pp. 65–66,
commentary in [6]). In the above quote it is clear that, in full
agreement with the weak segregation version of the perception-action
model, size is computed before the segregation. But the authors
are not consistent on this point. In agreement with the strong
segregation version of the perception-action model, size might also be
computed after the streams have segregated: ‘‘Although visually-
guided grasping of 3D objects requires processing of object size,
that computation appears to rely on different neural mechanisms
than those involved in the perceptual discrimination of size’’ [2]
(pp12). According to the newest formulation of the strong segregation
version of the perception-action model [1], it is suggested that visual
information can lead to a full analysis of features of an object in the
ventral stream without any knowledge of the derived features
being transferred to the dorsal stream. Instead the part of the array
of visual information where the object is located is flagged. The
flagged part of the array of visual information is then analyzed in
the dorsal stream (converted into features). A flagged part of the
array of visual information does not contain any information on
the features of an object. Length and orientation would have to be
computed from scratch in the dorsal stream. Based on the results
presented in Figure 3, this formulation, of the strong segregation version
of the perception-action model is implausible.
Because authors often do not specify whether they mean the
strong or the weak segregation version of the perception-action
model the model can explain most results from experiments where
participants perform motoric and symbolic responses to stimuli
where size or orientation are transformed due to a visual illusion.
According to Dyde and Milner [4,5,13], ‘‘any illusion operating
primarily at the early cortical level should inevitably influence
feedforward processing throughout the two visual streams (and
beyond). Such an illusion should yield associated illusions in both
perceptual and visuomotor tasks.’’ [4] (p. 526) (see also: [29]).
Milner and Dyde [5] suggest that researchers, before having
participants perform motoric and symbolic responses to stimuli
where the experience of size or orientation has been transformed
due to a visual illusion, should ask themselves where the likely
locus of the illusion is going to be within the brain. But for most if
not all illusions we do not know exactly where in the visual system
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they operate (see [27] for a discussion of the location in the visual
system of the Ebbinghaus-illusion). The consequence of the
suggestions of Dyde and Milner is that the perception-action
model is consistent with illusions both influencing and not
influencing action. On the one hand, every time experimental
results suggest that motoric responses are fooled by illusions the
perception-action model is unchallenged because it can be argued
that the illusion is influencing a given spatial feature before the
streams segregate. On the other hand, when only symbolic
responses are affected by the illusion, the perception-action model
is supported because it can be argued that the illusion is affecting
representations driving symbolic responses after the streams have
separated.
A consequence of this feature of the perception-action model is
that it cannot predict whether or not motoric and symbolic
responses to length and orientation, in the double response
experiment, should or should not be in agreement well above
chance.
Nevertheless, the common representation theory has been
pitted against the perception-action model [9,14,30], but from the
above analysis it follows that they are in fact not necessarily
opposed to each other. The perception-action model can take a
form (the weak segregation version of the perception-action model)
where one common neural area, wherein features are both
computed and represented, drives both symbolic and motoric
responses. According to this version the visual signals separate only
for the purpose of transforming the common representation into a
format suitable for making either a motoric or a symbolic
response.
A note on the use of brief exposure durations
If one wishes to explain the results from the present experiment
using the strong segregation version of the perception-action model,
according to which the parameters of the features are computed
separately in two processing streams, an alternative account of the
experimental results is necessary.
One possible alternative explanation is perhaps given by the
‘‘real-time view of action’’ hypothesis. According to the originators
of this hypothesis (proposed in support of the strong segregation version
of the perception-action model by [31]): ‘‘If the target is not visible
when the action is required, the motor control system accesses a
stored perceptual representation of the target object that
presumably was initially processed by form perception mecha-
nisms in the ventral stream’’ [13] (pp. 809). The motor control
system accesses the ventral stream representation because,
according to the ‘‘real-time view of action’’ hypothesis, the dorsal
vision-for-action system only computes the exact parametric values
of the movement at the very moment the movement is initiated.
In the current experiment the stimulus was presented for 47 ms
and the participant moved his hand towards the screen
immediately upon stimulus presentation. If these parameters of
the experimental paradigm forced the motoric responses to be
driven by a stored representation of the bar driving symbolic
responses it would explain the above chance alignment of
responses since they now both would be driven by a ventrally
situated representation.
A movement towards a target, initiated when the target is
presented, can be divided into a planning phase and a movement
phase. The planning phase starts upon presentation and ends
when the hand starts moving. The movement phase starts when
the hand starts moving and ends when the target is reached.
Translated into these terms then, according to the ‘‘real-time
view of action’’ hypothesis, if the target is visible during the
planning phase but not during movement time the dorsal stream
still computes the spatial parameters of the target. However, if the
target is removed before the planning phase begins, the ventral
stream computes the spatial parameters of the target instead of the
dorsal stream.
It is not clear the extent to which the bar in the present
paradigm can be said to be visible in the planning phase.
Nevertheless, it is present during 47 ms of planning time and is
unmasked so some sort of cortical iconic image [32] may be part of
the planning phase. This means that it is most likely available for
some unknown fraction of the planning phase.
At present the ‘‘real-time view of action’’ hypothesis is not
sufficiently elaborated to enable a decision as to whether or not,
according to the hypothesis, the bar, in the present experiment,
was available during enough of the planning phase to engage the
dorsal vision-for-action system. Therefore, it is hard to decide
whether or not it poses a critique. Nevertheless one can discuss the
validity of the critique itself. The main evidence in favor of the
‘‘real-time view of action’’ hypothesis is from a study by Westwood
and Goodale [31]. They cued participants to grasp a target among
objects in a size-contrast illusion display. When the target was
visible in the planning phase (but not during the movement phase)
the peak grip aperture during grasping was unaffected by the
illusion, but when occlusion of the target coincided with the cue to
begin grasping (and the target therefore was not visible during the
planning phase), the grasp was sensitive to the illusion. They
concluded that dorsal real-time visuomotor mechanisms are
engaged only after the planning phase is over, and only if the
target is visible during the movement phase. They further argued
that when these demands are not met the dorsal action system
cannot compute the absolute metrics of the target object and can
therefore not resist size-contrast illusions. Instead a ventrally
located representation is used for action planning. Because this
representation makes use of relational metrics it is sensitive to size-
contrast illusions.
Importantly though, Franz and co-workers [33] could not
replicate the finding. Instead they found a similar illusion effect in
both conditions (target visible during planning phase only or target
not visible during either planning nor movement phase).
Furthermore, they made the reasonable argument that when the
target is visible, during the movement phase, online feedback
mechanisms could have registered a possible grasping error
created by the illusion and this could have lead to online
corrections of the grasp thereby masking an illusion present in this
condition as well. In fact, by systematically decreasing visual
information of the target, only during the movement phase, from
full availability to zero availability, Franz and co-workers could
show that the illusion effect increased significantly. The less visual
availability the less on-line corrections of the error introduced by
the illusion.
To conclude, the use of brief exposure durations does not
seriously challenge the assumption, made in the present experi-
ment, that the motoric responses made by participants engage the
visuomotor system normally used for grasping objects in the real
world.
A note on the use of 2D stimuli
It has been suggested that one should be cautious when
interpreting results of experiments comparing perception and
action in which participants grasp 2D stimuli. The rationale
behind this suggestion is that the use of 2D stimuli might activate a
different set of visuomotor mechanisms than those engaged when
using 3D stimuli [34]. While awaiting empirical proof for this
suggestion we wish to draw attention to the work of Schenk [35]
who discloses a serious problem arising when using 3D objects in
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experiments directly comparing grasping performance to a
symbolic response.
A cornerstone in the evidence supporting the perception-action
model is the work done with patient DF [1,36]. DF has a damaged
ventral visual stream and suffers from visual form agnosia. She is
unable to correctly report the size of a 3D object, using a symbolic
response, but can match the opening of her hand to the size of the
object during grasping (motoric response). Because of this single
dissociation it was concluded that the neural substrate underlying
the use of size in the control of manual skills are distinct from those
underlying visual perception of size. In the sentence above we have
carefully adhered to the terminology of the original paper
reporting the grasping behavior of patient DF [36] to show an
example of a the weak segregation version of the perception-action
model where size is used by the neural substrate underlying a
motoric response. As noted earlier, this weak segregation version
of the perception-action model is not in disagreement with our
finding that, on a trial-by-trial basis, symbolic and motoric
responses to length and orientation of a bar are in agreement
significantly above chance level. Nevertheless, the point being
made here is that the use of 3D objects in experiments directly
comparing grasping performance to symbolic responses pose a real
problem that does not have to await empirical proof to be
substantiated. Schenk [35] demonstrates that the difference found
between DF’s ability to grasp a 3D block (normal performance)
and giving a symbolic response to width (sub-normal) is an artifact
of haptic information being available in the grasping task.
Removing haptic information equates her performance in the
two tasks so that both grasping and symbolic responses become
sub-normal [35]. That haptic information is utilized when
grasping 3D objects is easily demonstrated: try grasping something
with your eyes closed. Choose something that does not move when
you touch it. The first time you will be way off target. Next time
you will do better. By the third or fourth time grasping will be
nearly perfect, solely guided by haptic feedback. The grave
problem of haptic feedback from 3D objects points to a great
advantage of using 2D stimuli when comparing the task of making
a symbolic response to the task of making a motoric response: the
tasks are comparable.
Conclusion
Length and orientation of an object can be specified using two
different response types: either by intentional use of symbols or
motorically by directly acting upon the object. Here we
demonstrate that, on a trial-by-trial basis, symbolic and motoric
responses to length and orientation of a bar are in agreement
significantly above chance level. This finding is best explained by
assuming that symbolic and motoric responses to length and
orientation are driven by a common representation. Furthermore,
the accuracy of symbolic and motoric responses was very similar
for both length and orientation thus corroborating the conclusion
of a common representation driving both response types.
Given that a common representation drives both response types,
one will expect similar characteristics of the representation to be
reflected in both types of responses. One such is the finding that
both response types are driven by representations with the same
decay characteristics [20]. Our finding that both response types
are driven by a representation of objects where length and
orientation are processed independently is another shared basic
characteristic.
The stimuli used were briefly (47 ms) presented 2D bars. For
some this might raise the concern that the neural system driving
the motoric responses was not the dorsal stream system normally
activated when grasping 3D objects that are visible until the grasp
is completed. Instead, perhaps a ventral stream system was driving
the motoric responses. If so the well-above chance agreement
could be explained as a consequence of a common representation
of length and orientation residing in the ventral stream (for both
response types). Symbolic response to length follows Weber’s law
[26], but grasp precision of 3D objects does not [23]. Therefore it
has been suggested that motoric responses violating Weber’s law
can be seen as a marker for dorsal stream processing [25]. The
motoric responses to length in the present experiment could not be
shown to follow Weber’s law (see Figure 5). Therefore, in the
present experiment it is most likely that the dorsal stream
controlled the motoric responses, indicating that a common
representation of length and orientation was driving processing in
both the dorsal and the ventral stream.
It is conceivable that the well-above chance finding reported in
Figure 3 was driven by feedback from the motoric response to the
symbolic response. For this to happen, though, the visual
impressions of the hand making the motoric response must have
been appropriately associated with a symbolic response. Appro-
priately associating the motoric responses would have had to be a
learning process and in a learning process one improves over time.
Such an improvement over time should show up in an analysis of
the initial double response trials in session one. The well-above
chance finding should increase as participants became increasingly
better at associating the visual impressions of the hand making the
motoric response with the corresponding symbolic response. From
Figure 6 it is clear that the well-above chance finding did not
increase over time. Consequently, the analysis in Figure 6 refutes
the idea that the well-above chance finding could have been driven
by feedback from the motoric responses to the symbolic responses.
The question of whether a motoric response and a symbolic
response to the spatial features of an object are driven by one
common representation or two separate representations is a
question directed at the degree of segregation between the neural
processing underpinning motoric responses and symbolic respons-
es. The most influential theory, concerning the question of the
degree of segregation between the neural processing underpinning
motoric responses and symbolic responses, is the perception-action
model, by Milner and Goodale [1]. In the section ‘‘Relation to the
perception-action model by Milner and Goodale’’ we show that
there are in fact two versions of the perception-action model: a
version with strong segregation and a version with weak
segregation. In the strong segregation version two separately
computed representations of spatial features of objects are driving
motoric responses and symbolic responses [1–3]. In the weak
segregation version, a common representation of spatial features of
objects, drives both response types [4–6]. According to this version
the processing of the derived spatial features of objects separates
into segregated processing streams only for transforming the
representations into a neural format suitable for making either a
motoric or a symbolic response. Our finding supports the weak
segregations claim according to which a common representation
drives symbolic and motoric responses to both length and
orientation and goes against the strong segregation version of
the perception-action model.
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